# Prem Sagur Poudel-----------------
In the past decade, the development of transport and energy corridors across the Eurasian landmass has emerged as a major geopolitical theme. In this context, the rise of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), known as the Middle Corridor, should be viewed not merely as another infrastructure project, but as a reflection of profound structural changes in global trade and the balance of power. The Russia-Ukraine conflict that began in 2022, the instability in the Red Sea, and the global reassessment of supply chain resilience have transformed this route from an alternative into a strategic choice. This article analyzes the impact of the Middle Corridor's emergence on Russia-China relations, the Eurasian security architecture, and global trade, while also discussing the potential for Western intervention and instability in the region.
The Middle Corridor is a multi-modal transport route connecting China to Europe. Starting from Xi'an or Xinjiang in China, it passes through Kazakhstan, crosses the Caspian Sea, and then enters Europe via Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. Its total length comprises approximately 4,200 kilometers of rail route and 500 kilometers of sea route. As this route bypasses the territories of Russia and Iran, it is geopolitically regarded as a 'diversified route'.
Until 2022, the Northern Corridor (the route through Russia) accounted for 86 percent of China-Europe trade, while the Middle Corridor's share was less than 1 percent. However, this situation has changed dramatically over the past three years. Freight traffic through Kazakhstan increased fourfold between 2022 and 2026, reaching 4.1 million tons in 2025 – a 63 percent increase compared to the previous year. In 2025 alone, more than 400 block trains operated along this route, and currently, the transit time on the Xi'an-Baku corridor ranges from 11 to 16 days.
For Russia, the Middle Corridor might appear to be a sensitive issue, but the reality is different. On one hand, it seems to offer an alternative route to Europe bypassing Russia, but on the other hand, Russia itself is benefiting from the success of this corridor. Rather than viewing the development of the Middle Corridor as competition in Russia-China relations, it should be seen as an important dimension of Eurasian economic integration.
There are several concrete reasons why Russia does not completely oppose this corridor. First, Russia itself is seeking new routes to circumvent Western sanctions and diversify its trade. Second, Russia has not completely abandoned the Northern Corridor; even after the war, the freight capacity of that route remains above 100 million tons. Third, a practical understanding of a natural "division of labor" has developed between Russia and China in Central Asia – China focuses on trade and infrastructure, while Russia is established as the guardian of security, the labor market, and regional stability.
Russia is also utilizing the Middle Corridor to its advantage. Through the Caspian Sea and Kazakhstan, Russia is conducting trade while evading Western sanctions. Furthermore, Russia is planning to connect its International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with the Middle Corridor, which would provide Russia with a new route for its exports to the Indian Ocean and Gulf region, beyond Europe. Seen this way, the Middle Corridor is developing not as competition for Russia, but as a complementary route.
For China, the Middle Corridor represents a multi-dimensional strategic opportunity. First, it provides China with a chance to diversify its trade routes – a natural strategy for any nation. Second, China is developing this corridor as a major project under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to bring economic prosperity to the entire region.
China has made concrete investments in the Middle Corridor in recent years. In November 2025, China Railway Container Group (a subsidiary of China State Railway) joined the Middle Corridor Multimodal JV, a joint venture established in 2023 by the state railways of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. This participation has increased both China's strategic weight and operational presence in this corridor, but it should be viewed as a collective effort rather than the dominance of any single country.
Similarly, the Tacheng–Ayagoz railway project on the China-Kazakhstan border and the construction of a container hub at the Aktau port are underway. These projects demonstrate China's long-term vision: to build a seamless transport network from Xinjiang to Europe, from which Central Asian nations will also benefit equally.
Although the emergence of the Middle Corridor has introduced some complexities into Russia-China relations, both sides are managing them maturely. According to analysts, Russia and China are not merely competitors in Central Asia; their shared objective of balancing Western influence and maintaining regional stability keeps them united. It is essential to understand that it is natural for both Russia and China to prioritize their respective national interests, but this does not necessarily imply conflict between them.
According to a report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Russia and China are moving forward in Central Asia by dividing "spheres of responsibility" rather than "spheres of influence." This means they have not carved up the region among themselves, but are cooperating based on their respective capacities and comparative advantages. China focuses on infrastructure and trade, while Russia focuses on security, military cooperation, and the labor market. This division has developed organically and has strengthened regional stability.
In this context, it is natural to suspect that Western powers may attempt to create a rift in Russia-China relations. The European Union (EU) views the Middle Corridor as a major alternative route bypassing Russia, and under the EU's Global Gateway initiative, €12 billion has been allocated for Central Asia. However, questions have been raised about the effectiveness of European investment. According to Euractiv, "the need for multiple transshipments, different rail gauges, and the necessity to cross the Caspian and Black Seas add delays." Similarly, attracting private sector investment has been difficult, mainly due to high costs and regulatory uncertainty.
In contrast, China's BRI initiative is undertaking tangible infrastructure development in Central Asia. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has provided a $150 million loan for the construction of a 130-kilometer railway bypass line in Almaty, which will ensure a freight handling capacity of over 100 million tons at the China-Kazakhstan border by 2040.
The growing interest of Western powers in the development of the Middle Corridor can be viewed from two perspectives. First, it can be seen as a positive contribution to Eurasian connectivity, potentially bringing economic diversification and development to the region. Second, it can also be viewed as a strategic attempt to disrupt Russia-China cooperation.
History has shown that Western powers often seek to exploit regional disputes and tensions for their geopolitical interests. There are ample examples of this in Central Asia and the South Caucasus region. Therefore, both Russia and China need to remain vigilant about the potential for Western intervention in this region. However, this does not mean completely rejecting cooperation with the West. Cooperation based on transparency and mutual benefit could benefit the entire region.
Central Asian nations have adopted a policy of "multi-vector diplomacy." They seek to balance Russian security and labor markets, Chinese infrastructure and investment, and European technology and standards. This is a natural and prudent policy that enables smaller nations to pursue their development without falling under the sway of major powers.
Countries like Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are leveraging the development of this corridor for their national interests. While maintaining balanced relations with both Russia and China, they are also expanding economic partnerships with the West. This diplomacy can be expected to bring long-term stability and prosperity to the region.
The rise of the Middle Corridor has opened a new chapter in Eurasian geopolitics. It has added a new dimension to Russia-China relations, but viewing it solely as competition would be misleading. The reality is that both Russia and China can benefit from the development of this corridor if they can manage their relationship harmoniously.
It is natural to be concerned about the growing presence of Western powers in this region, but Russia and China can counter this by further strengthening mutual cooperation and trust. Only cordial relations between two large neighboring and partner nations can ensure long-term stability and prosperity in this region.
According to analyst estimates, by 2035, the Middle Corridor could attract 10 to 20 percent of the total trade between Europe and China. Its success will largely depend on cooperation among regional nations, the pace of infrastructure development, and geopolitical stability. In this evolving landscape, Russia and China need to cooperate for shared goals while safeguarding their respective national interests. Only this cooperation can prevent Western powers from spreading instability in the region.
The Middle Corridor is a bridge, not a gap. It not only connects East and West, but can also connect Russia and China in new ways, if both sides view it as an opportunity for cooperation. This requires mutual trust, transparency, and a long-term shared vision. The future of Eurasia depends on this.
