The Nepali Army, whose historical origins date back to the Gorkhali Army, has evolved institutionally over time to its current form. However, complaints are being raised from tea stalls to analysts that the Nepali Army's structure, efficiency, and strategic planning at the international level are weak and based on outdated structures when compared to today's security challenges, geopolitical balance, and modern military doctrines.
Due to Nepal's geographical location, limited defense budget, and historical policy of neutrality, the Nepali Army's scope of operations has always been different from that of other countries. However, this has also created a situation that is not in line with current realities and needs.
The Nepal Army currently has about 96,000 active military personnel, including officers, junior officers, and soldiers. However, there has been widespread criticism of the lack of clear transparency and realistic implementation of their structure, hierarchy, and distribution of roles. For example, when looking at the balance of military positions, there is a cluster of excessive officers in the same rank, which has led to confusion in the decision-making process and increased interdependence with each other.
The four-star general, or the position of Chief of Army Staff, appears to be very different in terms of functionality, decision-making authority, and strategic independence when compared to its American or Indian military counterpart, the general. The Nepali Army Chief of Staff cannot directly intervene in the formulation of national security policy, while in the United States, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plays a role in providing direct strategic advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. In India, the Army Chief participates in decision-making as a member of the National Security Advisory Council.
The Nepal Army's hierarchical system has also been the subject of criticism. For example, the presence of more than 300 colonels and lieutenant colonels in a force of about 80,000 indicates a structure focused on increasing prestige rather than functional needs. In international practice, a lieutenant colonel has at least one battalion (700-900 soldiers) under his command, but such a practical match is not found in the Nepali context. Most colonel-level officers are limited to administrative responsibilities, which seriously affects the command structure.
The "command-staff" structure used by the Nepalese Army is also based on the old model, which seems to be dominated by a headquarters-centered administrative network rather than a field command. While developed nations are using flexible command structures based on multi-level war-preparedness structures, cyber units, space defense, and joint military exercises.
Looking at the military training system, the Nepali Army appears to be dependent on officer training in countries like India's IMA (Indian Military Academy), the US, China, and the UK. While China is producing policy leadership through PLA University, the US, West Point, and Russia are producing policy leadership through their top defense academies.
Another serious issue is the Nepali Army's lack of strategic study, research, and policy-making capacity. In today's era, security institutions are engaging in fierce battles involving not only military force, but also intelligence, technology, cyber, psychological, space strategy, drone-centric strategic use, and public opinion manipulation. There is no clear unit, research center, or long-term plan of the Nepal Army on such issues.
International militaries have built mechanisms for civilian oversight into their internal organizations. The US military operates entirely under political leadership. Transparency is maintained in the British Army through a system of parliamentary reporting. However, civilian control is still unclear in the case of the Nepali Army. The "Defense Committee Report" in Parliament is not published regularly, which has raised doubts about the military's transparency and accountability system.
The structure of the military budget is another challenge. Nepal spends about 5% of its total budget on the military, but it seems to focus on salaries, allowances, and construction rather than structural reforms. By remaining limited to old guns, helicopters, or patrol vehicles without investing in modern weapons systems, technology transfer, or research, the military appears to be playing the role of a “backup force” rather than defending the state.
There is also a serious imbalance in the number of soldiers and their division of labor. Some battalions are symbolically maintained only for banners, headquarters, or parades, while forces are not redeployed as needed in areas of real security challenges (borders, internal security, conflict management). In the border districts of the Far West, where smuggling, foreign influence, or criminal networks are rampant, the practical military presence seems negligible.
The Nepali Army has also been relatively weak in military diplomacy. Participation in international peacekeeping forces, which is the basis of the Nepali Army's reputation, still continues in the old format of the United Nations. While India has increased its military role in regional security alliances like BIMSTEC and QUAD. China is establishing the Belt and Road Security Coordination through military diplomacy. At such a time, the Nepali Army's limited regional diplomatic role can be considered a loss of strategic opportunity.
In this light, although the Nepali Army is a glorious, brave, and trusted institution by the people, it appears that its internal structure, efficiency, strategic planning, comparison with international practices, and future preparedness require further in-depth review, reform, and policy restructuring. The Nepali Army now has no choice but to rise above mere military displays or UN missions and make serious efforts towards geopolitical realities, border security, the use of technology, and the production of strategic leadership.
