[Anchor] Middle East Report with James M. Dorsey on Sabah al-Muslim. James, good morning. Welcome.
[James M. Dorsey] Good morning. As always, it’s a pleasure to be with you.
[Anchor] So, the arrest of Shiite clerics in the Sunni-ruled Shiite-majority Bahrain and the recent assassinations in Iran of Baloch and Kurdish religious figures has raised once again the spectre of the U.S.-Iran war energising ethnic and religious fault lines. The potential fissures threaten to add domestic strife to a conflict that already tears at the fabric of the Iranian and Gulf Indeed.
[James M. Dorsey] In recent months, Bahrain, the only Gulf state that is home to a Shiite-Muslim majority and a prime target for retaliatory strikes in the Islamic Republic’s on-off tit-for-tat war with the United States, has rounded up scores of religious scholars whom authorities accuse of conspiring with Iran. The arrests sparked protests and threats by armed Iranian-backed militant groups formed in the wake of mass anti-government protests in 2011, the spring’s largest in the Gulf, that were squashed by a Saudi-led intervention force. The government’s crackdown has fuelled sectarian tensions with Shiite and Sunni Muslims denouncing each other online and in person to the authorities.
Shiites have long complained that Bahrain’s ruling Sunni al-Khalifa family marginalises them. If Shiite unrest in Bahrain creates opportunity for Iran, minority stirrings in the Islamic Republic’s Kurdish and Baloch provinces threaten the country’s fragile domestic stability and potentially its territorial integrity. The ethnic minority’s demography and geography, straddling all the Islamic Republic’s borders, magnify the threat of domestic strife in a destabilised Iran.
A series of killings of pro-government Baloch and Kurdish clerics and clashes with security forces raises a spectre of ethnic unrest.
[Anchor] Now, since attacking Iran on February 28th, US President Trump and Israeli leaders have played with the idea of encouraging Iranian Kurdish militants operating from bases in autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan to open a new front in Iran’s predominantly Kurdish western provinces. They have responded in a kind of lukewarm manner to both the US and Israeli treaties.
[James M. Dorsey] Indeed, the option of a renewed Kurdish insurgency to encourage ethnic strife in Iran could evaporate as Iraqi Kurdistan, caught in a catch-22, struggles to preserve its hard-fought autonomy. A recent agreement between President Ahmad al-Shara’s government and the Syrian Democratic Forces to integrate the predominantly Kurdish force into the country’s national army has all but ended the dream of a self-governing Kurdish entity in northeast Syria, and prompted fears that the Iraqi government may embrace the Syrian model. Add to that the fact that this month’s withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, including air defences in Iraqi Kurdistan, makes the autonomous region more dependent on the Baghdad government, and more exposed to Iranian attacks on Iranian Kurdish positions in the region.
Moreover, hardline Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have demanded that the Peshmerga, autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan’s military force, be disbanded or placed under the command of the Iraqi military as a condition for their compliance with the Iraqi government’s deadline for armed groups operating outside state control to surrender their heavy arms. The hardliners further demand that Iranian Kurdish groups be expelled from Iraqi Kurdistan.
[Anchor] The US midterm elections loom large in the minds of President Trump and Iranian leaders, but for different reasons. And as a result, the question is not if there will be a return to all-out war, but when.
[James M. Dorsey] Despite Trump speaking of progress in indirect talks at the United Nations, Iran and the United States are nowhere closer to any kind of agreement, even if it were only temporary. If anything, October looms large, with the midterm scheduled for November 3, the Trump administration and Iran escalating their rhetoric and the US increasing the pressure and provoking stark Iranian responses. The Trump administration has yet to publicly comment on an Iranian proposal to break the stalemate but is unlikely to accept it.
Beyond shortening timelines, the proposal reiterates Iran’s longstanding position. The proposal calls for the opening of the Strait of Hormuz within a seven-day period, provided the United States lifts its blockade of Iranian ports and sanctions on oil exports, and releases frozen Iranian funds. Iranian President Masoud Peeshkian said the ball was now in the US court.
In the absence of compromises by both the United States and Iran, the risk of a return to all-out war looms ever larger.
[Anchor] And finally then James, it’s two weeks since Yemen’s Houthi rebels captured the port of Al-Mokha coastline along the strategic Bab al-Mandab waterway. Saudi Arabia has yet to respond beyond a number of bombings for Houthi positions. What are Saudi’s options?
[James M. Dorsey] Saudi Arabia has yet to confirm Houthi claims that the rebels have most recently attacked military facilities in the kingdom. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has yet to respond to the rebels’ advances and attack on the kingdom’s crucial East-West oil pipeline beyond airstrikes that have not changed the tide of the battle between the Houthis and forces of the Saudi-backed internationally recognised Yemeni government. Saudi hesitancy reflects the stark and difficult choices the country faces.
It either cuts a deal with the Houthis, which would strengthen their grip on rebel-held territory, or Saudi Arabia opts for an all-out war, which would have to involve ground troops. Requests for help from the kingdom’s allies have been mixed. None of the allies, including the United States, Europe, Turkey, and Pakistan, want to be sucked into a war in Yemen.
The U.S. has sent military advisers that share intelligence and help with targeting. Pakistan has troops on the Saudi side of the border with Yemen. France is sending troops to protect the Red Sea port of Yanbu/
Hardliners in Saudi Arabia increasingly sound like Israelis speaking about Gaza when they argue that the kingdom cannot afford to have a group on its border like the Houthis that can blackmail the kingdom whenever it wants. The hardliners say the lag in Saudi response is because the kingdom needs time to gear up for a major offensive. That may be true, but so may the possibility that the kingdom has yet to decide which way it wants to go.
[Anchor] All right, James, as always, thank you so much for your time and have a great week.
[James M. Dorsey] Always great to be with you. Wish you all the best.
@James M. Dorsey From The Turbulent World With James M. Dorsey
