Written by Abdul Hameed
At the two-day international environmental conference hosted by Islamabad called “Breathe Pakistan” last month, former minister Sherry Rehman remarked that “climate change knows no borders.” Her comments suggested that just as the challenge of changing environmental patterns is transboundary, the response must be as well. One of the critical threats exacerbated by environmental changes in South Asia is transboundary water resource management, driven by fluctuations in the flow of the region’s many transboundary water bodies. The Indus River System in Pakistan is projected to lose over 30 percent of water flow by 2025, and the Ganga, Brahmaputra, and Meghna basin is also facing severe fluctuation due to climatic variability. Such fluctuations can increase competition for water resources and further complicate inter-state relations as most of the South Asian countries are already facing water scarcity at different levels.
The existing complex security calculus in the region is already fragile, marked by historical territorial disputes, geopolitical competition between two nuclear powers, redundant arms control mechanisms, economic and political instability across Pakistan, war-torn Afghanistan, revolutionized Bangladesh, and the rise of hyper-nationalism in India. Environmental triggers can impact this fragile balance. Increased dry spells and difficulty in flood management would exacerbate domestic pressures, pushing countries towards tough foreign policy choices. While existing treaties have played a key role in ensuring stable water resource management in South Asia, they need to be updated to reflect current times. Unlike other bilateral issues among the South Asian countries, water management cannot afford a stalemate, as overstressed transboundary river basins and environmental challenges could severely impact human, economic, and food security.
Updating the Indus Waters Treaty
The Indo-Gangetic Plain houses three significant transboundary river systems: the Indus, the Ganga, and the Brahmaputra. Water-sharing mechanisms have been developed to adjudicate these river systems, which run across the borders of relatively less friendly countries. The most important of these mechanisms is the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between Pakistan and India, which was brokered by the World Bank in 1960.
Unlike other bilateral issues among South Asian countries, water management cannot afford a stalemate, as overstressed transboundary river basins and environmental challenges would severely impact human, economic, and food security.
IWT divides the rights to the Indus River Basin, giving the eastern rivers (Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum) to Pakistan. The IWT is regarded as a success story by many who celebrate its resilience in the face of wars and other crises, like the Kargil conflict and the Pulwama-Balakot crisis, between the signatories. However, many experts in India and Pakistan advocate updating the treaty, citing equity concerns and the impact of climate change and groundwater extraction on the Indus Basin.
Most recently, in September 2024, India sent an official notice to Pakistan to review the IWT and indicated that the Indus Waters Commissioners’ regular meetings will not occur until the request is entertained. India also sent a notice in January 2023 asking for the same. Both times Pakistan asked to discuss the matter in the Permanent Indus Commission. Both countries have reservations about the IWT. Pakistan’s concerns as a lower riparian are that India has violated the treaty by building the Kishanganga Hydro Project on the Jhelum river, the Shahpurkandi Dam on the Ravi river, and by threatening to run Pakistan dry in the pursuit of other diplomatic ambitions. Meanwhile, in the face of increased water shortages domestically, India is trying to utilize its water resources as much as possible. However, this maximum utilization can sometimes hurt lower riparian states and carry both geopolitical and environmental costs.
As much as the IWT is celebrated for being resilient, it faces serious challenges in the context of fluctuating flows due to environmental factors and excessive groundwater extraction. Given existing disputes in India-Pakistan relations, making the IWT adaptive to changing environmental patterns is crucial before the situation becomes more tense.
Renegotiating the Ganga Water Sharing Treaty
India and Bangladesh also have a bilateral mechanism to resolve disputes on the Ganga River—the Ganga Water Sharing Treaty, signed in 1996—to manage water flow from the Farakka barrage in India to Bangladesh. The Farakka barrage, constructed in 1975, created problems for Bangladesh as the lower riparian state, impacting the riverine ecology and the agricultural sector. But it is significant for India as it helps maintain and preserve the Kolkata port and improves navigability. After years of engagement, both countries signed the treaty in 1996 to resolve this issue. However, the problem has festered as it affects domestic politics in both countries.
Unlike the IWT, this treaty is time-bound and is set to expire in 2026, which would mean that the stakeholders would have to renegotiate its terms. Given frosty relations between the two countries since the fall of former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s regime, these negotiations may be complex. Experts have argued that the treaty favors India on water equity and that it only pertains to one barrage whereas the countries have 54 transboundary rivers between them. In the absence of water-sharing mechanisms, other rivers such as the Teesta have been at the center of disputes between the two countries. These disputes can impact Bangladesh’s agriculture and economy, and also carry environmental consequences for India.
Nepal-India Water Dynamics: India as Lower Riparian Neighbor
India and Nepal’s dynamics are different from the others as India is the lower riparian neighbor in this case. There are three water-sharing mechanisms between Nepal and India, namely, the Kosi Agreement (1954), the Gandak Agreement (1959), and the Mahakali Treaty (1996). Under the Kosi and Gandak Agreements, India helped Nepal build barrages on the two rivers for flood management, as floods in these rivers also impacted the state of Bihar in India. Nepal retained ownership of the barrages and India bore all the construction costs and the compensation paid to the affected people. The Mahakali Treaty was signed in 1996 between the two countries, but unfortunately, the project has not progressed past signing due to differences over its interpretation and the Detailed Project Report of the Pancheshwar project.
Despite being the upper riparian state, Nepal has been raising concerns on several fronts. Kathmandu argues that the treaties are not sufficiently equitable in terms of water supply. For instance, the total irrigation potential of the Kosi Barrage is 1.5 million acres, out of which only 29,000 acres are in Nepal. Concerns have also been raised over unpaid compensation to the Nepali people and unaccounted ecosystem losses in Nepal.
Contested Water-Sharing Mechanisms in South Asia: Future Problems
South Asia may be poised to face several challenges resulting from changing environmental patterns. Rising global temperatures could increase glacial melting, which, along with the changing precipitation patterns, may make flooding more frequent. Dry spells may also increase, which will increase competition for water, complicate relationships between neighboring countries, and encourage groundwater extraction, thereby damaging the riverine ecology and contributing to environmental degradation. The increasing population and demand for food, housing, and sanitation will exacerbate these issues. Domestic political pressures as a result of water scarcity or flooding can adversely affect states’ foreign policy choices, and in turn, impact regional security.
Domestic political pressures as a result of water scarcity or flooding can adversely affect states’ foreign policy choices, and in turn, impact regional security.
The region’s existing water-sharing mechanisms are outdated and do not account for recent ecological and environmental changes and their impact on water resources. Increasing temperatures are bound to stress water resources further, making less water available to countries, especially during dry seasons.. Existing mechanisms must be rethought, with new formulas for water sharing and limits to groundwater extraction. Transboundary measurement mechanisms, data sharing, early warning systems, and prior notification in case of excess water release should also be included in updated bilateral agreements.
The presence of other regional actors and their stake in water-sharing can also complicate matters. For instance, most of the rivers that flow into India from Nepal come from China. In fact, China houses a total of 40 transboundary rivers, being a riparian neighbor to every country in South Asia except Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and has upstream status in the majority of these cases. Increasingly close relations between Nepal and China could lead Kathmandu to seek Beijing’s help for its water resource management—including the building of irrigation canals and smaller dams—and can trigger water insecurity in India. Similarly, Afghanistan’s aim to construct a dam on the Kunar and Kabul rivers, which are tributaries of the Indus, can have serious implications for Pakistan. Thus, the water-sharing architecture in South Asia needs to be revamped to account for other regional actors, adaptation to climate variability, new equity formulas, and flood management systems to help the region navigate potential security crises.
@SAV
