At first glance, the idea of productive cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) may seem ambitious, if not far-fetched. The EAEU, a relatively new and politically driven economic union formed by post-Soviet states, and SAARC, a loosely integrated regional organization burdened by political tensions and economic disparity, appear to have little in common. With their vastly different political landscapes, development models, and regional priorities, the prospect of meaningful cooperation between these two entities raises valid doubts. However, upon closer examination, one begins to find compelling reasons to reconsider this skepticism. As global trends shift towards multipolarity and regional economic alliances, the idea of collaboration between the EAEU and SAARC may hold more potential than initially meets the eye—especially for countries like Nepal.
The first challenge lies in the fundamental differences between the EAEU and SAARC. The EAEU, consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, is driven by an ambitious project of deep economic integration, with established mechanisms for a customs union, free movement of goods, services, and labor, and a supranational body, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), that governs trade policies. This level of integration starkly contrasts with SAARC, a group of South Asian nations that, despite its potential, has long struggled to advance meaningful economic cooperation. Internal political conflicts, particularly between India and Pakistan, have often paralyzed the organization’s decision-making process, making it difficult for SAARC to evolve beyond a symbolic entity into a robust economic bloc.
Given these disparities, the idea of fostering dialogue between the two organizations may initially seem impractical. EAEU’s more structured approach and SAARC’s slower pace of integration create challenges in aligning their goals. Furthermore, the geopolitical complexities of South Asia, with its historical rivalries and divergent foreign policy priorities, add to the difficulty of envisioning how a meaningful partnership could emerge.
However, dismissing the idea entirely would be shortsighted. Upon further reflection, one finds that there are numerous factors which suggest that cooperation between the EAEU and SAARC may indeed hold untapped potential. First and foremost, global economic trends have shifted significantly in recent years. As both regions face increasing external pressures—such as sanctions, trade restrictions, and the evolving dynamics of great power competition—regional alliances are becoming more important. In this context, the EAEU and SAARC could potentially find common ground by pooling resources and leveraging complementary strengths to adapt to a more fragmented global economy.
One compelling statistic to consider is the combined population of SAARC nations, which totals over 1.8 billion people, accounting for more than 23% of the global population. This contrasts sharply with the much smaller population of the EAEU, which collectively has around 180 million people. However, the EAEU holds significant leverage in terms of its natural resources, particularly energy. Russia alone, a key member of the EAEU, produces approximately 12% of the world’s oil and holds 17% of the global natural gas reserves, making it a crucial player in the global energy market. For SAARC members, many of whom are energy importers, securing stable energy supplies from the EAEU could be a strategic win.
Trade volume between the EAEU and South Asia is currently limited, but it shows room for expansion. For example, Russia’s trade with India, the largest SAARC member, amounted to $13.5 billion in 2021, showing a steady upward trend. However, this is still relatively small when compared to Russia’s trade with China, which exceeded $147 billion in the same period. Increasing EAEU-SAARC trade relations, particularly in areas like energy, agriculture, and technology, could significantly benefit both regions.
From a Nepali perspective, the potential for dialogue between the EAEU and SAARC offers intriguing possibilities. As a landlocked nation situated between two geopolitical giants—India and China—Nepal has historically pursued a policy of non-alignment, maintaining friendly relations with all sides while avoiding entanglement in regional conflicts. This unique positioning allows Nepal to act as a neutral facilitator, promoting dialogue and cooperation between regions that might otherwise have little reason to interact.
Nepal’s own developmental needs align with many of the opportunities that could arise from EAEU-SAARC cooperation. For instance, Nepal’s current GDP, estimated at $36.29 billion in 2023, remains modest compared to the larger SAARC economies like India ($3.73 trillion) and Bangladesh ($465 billion). Yet, Nepal’s strategic geographic location and its role as a logistical crossroads give it a unique advantage in promoting infrastructure projects that could benefit both the EAEU and SAARC. Strengthening transport links, such as cross-border highways and railway projects, would improve regional connectivity and potentially make Nepal a hub for trade and logistics between Central and South Asia.
Moreover, Nepal could leverage its existing partnerships, such as its engagement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to help foster connectivity projects that link Central Asia and South Asia. For instance, cross-border railways or highways funded by multilateral investments could facilitate smoother trade between the EAEU and SAARC, while also bolstering Nepal’s position as a logistics and trade hub.
At the same time the obstacles to cooperation should not be underestimated. The political rifts within SAARC, particularly the long-standing tensions between India and Pakistan, continue to be a significant impediment to regional cooperation. However, this does not necessarily mean that collaboration with the EAEU is impossible. Both organizations could focus on non-contentious areas—such as trade, energy, technology transfer, and climate resilience—that offer mutual benefits without triggering geopolitical tensions. In these areas, there is substantial room for constructive engagement, especially if dialogue is framed around practical economic goals rather than broader political agendas.
Moreover, the institutional differences between the EAEU and SAARC, while real, do not preclude collaboration. In fact, the EAEU’s more structured and rules-based framework could serve as a model for SAARC to improve its own economic cooperation mechanisms. By learning from the EAEU’s experience in reducing tariff barriers, harmonizing standards, and fostering cross-border investment, SAARC could benefit from a more disciplined approach to regional economic integration.
In conclusion, while the idea of EAEU-SAARC cooperation may initially seem implausible due to their differences in integration models and political contexts, the evolving global economic landscape presents compelling reasons to consider such collaboration. Countries like Nepal, with their neutral diplomatic stance and strategic geographic location, are well-positioned to facilitate this dialogue. By focusing on pragmatic areas of cooperation—such as energy, infrastructure, and technological development—the EAEU and SAARC could both stand to gain from deeper engagement, while Nepal reaps the benefits of enhanced regional connectivity and economic growth.
In the end, skepticism toward this concept may be valid, but the potential rewards of overcoming these challenges and fostering a cross-regional partnership cannot be ignored. With careful diplomacy, pragmatic decision-making, and a focus on mutual economic benefit, EAEU-SAARC cooperation could transform from a doubtful idea into a productive reality.